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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The

Utah

pursuant

Court

nt

Appeals has

MD

is<i

I IUII

to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3 (2) (a)

Ann. § 63-46b-16(l)

nuttt i

(1996) and Utah Code

(1988 as amended).

STATEMENT 01
1.

i i this

KSSULS PRESENTED I Ml' Ihh.IEW

Whether the Findings of Fact of the hearing panel

are

supported by substantial record evidence.
a.

As to issues of fact, the appeals court will « hange

the Agency's Finding only if it "is not supported by substantial
evidence

when

850 P. 2d

Comm'n

in

light

of

the

whole

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (g) ; King

Court."
Utah,

viewed

1281, 1285

H4'> P ^d
<y .

84R

(Utah App.

852-54

record
v.

before

Indus.

Comm'n

1993) citing Zissi

v.

the
of
Tax

(Utah 1992).

Whether the Agency action

in the case of Dr.

Taylor's

license revocation was unconstitutional and whether the Agency has
engaged

i in I wfnl

procedure or decision-making process, or has

failed to follow a prescribed procedure?
a. I As
review

*f|rMi<

to

issues

of

general

interpretations

"under

J w,
a

the

appeals

correction

ot

standard, giving no deference to the Agency's decision."
Indus.

Comm'n

of

Utah,

court
error

King

v.

850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Utah

Code Ann, k f»3-46b- 1 h (4 / ( d i .
b.

As to issues of agency

court will determine whether the

1

specific

legislature

law, the

appeals

explicitly

granted

discretion to the Agency to interpret or apply statutory language
at issue and if such a grant exists, the court will review the
decision based on an abuse of discretion standard.
Comm'n of

Utah,

King

v.

Indus.

850 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(i).
If the appeals court does not find an exclusive grant of
discretion and if the statutory language is broad and expansive or
subject

to

numerous

interpretations,

the

appeals

court

will

similarly review the decision based on an abuse of discretion
Id.

standard.

If the language is unambiguous and can be interpreted and
applied based on traditional methods of statutory construction, the
appeals court reviews the agency action based on a correction of
errors standard.
c.

An

Id.;

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d).

agency's

application

of

law

to

its

factual

findings will not be disturbed "unless its determination exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."
of

Real

Estate,

790

P. 2d

Department of Administrative

102

(Utah

Services

App.

Rogers
1990)

v. Public Service

v.
citing

Division
Utah

Comm'n, 658

P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
3.

Whether the Agency

action proposed

in this case was

contrary to the Agency's prior practice or appropriately justified
by the Agency upon fair and rational bases.

2

As \ <

a
r "news

Atjssi ^

issues of general

interpretations

"undei

law, the appeals

court

\

error

correction
lf

standard, giving no deference to the Agency's decision
Indus.

Comm'n of

Utah,

of

King

v.

850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Utah

Code Ann. ', S3-46b- 1 M I |( f 1| .
I

As to issues of agency specific law

the appeals

court will determine whether the legislature explicitly granted
discretion tn I he Agtinoy to interpret or apply statutory language
at issue and if such a grant exists, the court will review the
decision based on an abuse of discretion standard.
Comm'n of

King

v.

Indus.

8(>n P MI I^BI, 1291 (Utah App. 1993), Utah Code

Utah,

Ann. ', 63-46b-16(4) (h) (i) .
If the appeals court does not find an exclusive grant of
discretion and it the statutory language is broad and expansive or
subject

to

numerous

interpretations,

the

appeals

court

similarly review the decision based on an abuse of

will

discretion

Id.

standard.

If the language is unambiguous and can be interpreted and
applied based on traditional methods of statutory construction, the
appeals court reviews the agency action !M I ii UH -J (Direction of
errors standard.
c.

An

Id.;

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d).

agency's

application

of

law

to

its

factual

findings will not be disturbed "unless its determination exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality "

3

Rogers

v.

Division

of

Real

Estate,

790

P. 2d

Department of Administrative

102

(Utah

Services

App.

1990)

v. Public Service

citing

Comm'n, 658

P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO APPEAL.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.11
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7.
(2)
The division may refuse to issue a
license to an applicant and may refuse to
renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place
on probation, issue* a public or private
reprimand to, or otherwise act ^ u p ° n the
license of any licensee in any of the
following cases:
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged
in unprofessional conduct, as defined by
statute or rule under this title;"
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2)(a) (1993 as amended)
(2) "Unprofessional conduct" means conduct,
by a licensee or applicant, that is defined as
unprofessional conduct under this title or
under any rule adopted under this title and
includes:

(b) violating, or aiding or abetting any
other person to violate, any generally
accepted professional or ethical standard
applicable to an occupation or profession
regulated under this title;

(g) practicing or attempting to practice an
occupation or profession regulated under this
title
through
gross
incompetence,
gross

4

Utah

negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or
negligence;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501 (2) (b) , (g)
(6)
"unprofessional conduct11 as defined in
Section 58-1-501 and as may be further defined
by rule includes:
(a)
applying unsanitary methods or
procedures
in the treatment of any
animal, contrary to rules adopted by the
board and approved by the division;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-28-2 (6) (a) (1993 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (full text attached as Appendix 0001)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (full text attached as Appendix 00020003)
(3) A veterinarian shall maintain a sanitary
environment to avoid sources and transmission
of infection to include the proper routine
disposal
of waste materials
and
proper
sterilization
and/or
sanitation
of
all
equipment used in diagnosis and/or treatment.
Utah Admin. Code R156-28-8(3) (1994 as amended)
STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

Petitioner Dr. Leo II. Taylor is » licensed veterinarian

in the state of Utah and has been licensed and practiced within the
state since 1956. He maintains a large and small animal veterinary
practice known
Utah.

i

1 lie Bruokside 'tniinal Hospital

II Wpst Jordan,

See Transcript of March 18-20, 1996 Hearing, "Transcript,"

316:15 through 317:10 (Appendix 00257).

A copy of the Transcript

is also attached to the Record as a separate document.

5

2.

The Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of

the Department of Commerce ("Division") filed a Petition against
Dr. Taylor on February 23, 1995 alleging he violated the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
58-1-101, et seq.,
seq.

and the Veterinary Practice Act §§ 58-28-1, et

The Division based its allegations against Dr. Taylor on five

(5) different animals which Dr. Taylor allegedly treated during a
sixteen (16) month period, July, 1993 to October, 1994. Petition,
(R 456-468).
3.

A

hearing

Administrative

was

held

on

March

Law Judge J. Steven Eklund

veterinarians and one lay person.

48-20,

1996

before

and a panel of two

At the conclusion of the three-

day hearing, the Division entered a document styled "Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order," which was signed
by Judge Eklund on April 12, 1996, "Findings", (Appendix 0004 to
0023).
4.

Oscar, a cocker spaniel was operated on for a broken leg

by Dr. Taylor, on July 10, 1993. Dr. Taylor repaired the fracture
by inserting an intramedullary pin into the bone.

On July 19,

1993, Oscar was taken to a second veterinarian who determined the
fracture was not united and the intramedullary pin was not in its
proper place.

Oscar was later taken to a third veterinarian who

specialized on orthopedic surgery who, on July 21, 199 3 performed
a second surgery on Oscar's leg.

6

The Division

found that Dr.

Taylor did not insert the intramedullary pin in the proper place
and

inappropriately

used a galvanized

setting Oscar's leg.
did

not

maintain

pin

and

chromic gut

in

The Division further found that Dr. Taylor

records

on

Oscar's

history

and

condition.

Findings, p. 2 5 3 to p. 5 J 13 (Appendix 0005-0008).
5.

Nadia, a chow/lab mix, was treated by Dr. Taylor for

mastitis on December 23, 1993.

The Division found that Dr. Taylor

failed

records

to

condition.
6.

maintain

adequate

on

Nadia's

history

and

Findings, p. 5 55 14-17 (Appendix 0008) .
Hillary,

an English

bulldog

owned

by

Cindy

Bue

was

artificially inseminated by Dr. Taylor on April 21 and 23, 1994.
On June 18, Hillary exhibited labor pains prior to reaching full
gestation.

The Division found that Ms. Bue contacted Dr. Taylor

and told him about Hillary's apparent labor pains.

After Hillary

passed two dead puppies, Ms. Bue took Hillary to Brookside Animal
Hospital on June 19 in the morning.

Dr. Taylor examined Hillary by

palpation only, but failed to take an x-ray.
Bue the dead puppies were premature.

Dr. Taylor told Ms.

Hillary stayed at Brookside

Animal Hospital overnight and on June 20, Ms. Bue was informed by
Brookside that Hillary had passed her last dead puppy and had been
"flushed out", cleaning her uterus.

After being released from

Brookside, Hillary passed another dead puppy and was taken to a
different clinic.

The second veterinarian Dr. Chinn to an x-ray

which showed one more puppy inside Hillary and a c-section was

7

performed to help Hillary pass the last dead puppy.

The Division

found that Dr. Taylor did not maintain adequate records regarding
Hillary's history and conditions.

Findings, p. 6 5 18 through p.

8 J 26 (Appendix 0009-0011).
7.

Shakesbear, a chow-chow owned by Cheryl Devlin was seen

by Dr. Taylor on May 24, 1994, after Shakesbear fell off a twelve
(12) foot porch.

Ms. Devlin's brother Alvin Dean Schofield took

Shakesbear to Dr. Taylor who examined Shakesbear, took one x-ray
and discovered

spine and disk

injuries.

Dr. Taylor

told Mr.

Schofield that there was not a good chance Sliakesbear would walk
again

and

that

he

should

consider

Shakesbear from enduring more pain.

euthanization

to

prevent

When Mr. Schofield picked up

Shakesbear from Brookside Animal Hospital on May 26, Shakesbear was
purportedly wet and smelled of urine.

Shakesbear was taken to a

veterinary orthopedic specialist who determined that Shakesbear
could feel pain in his hind quarters and gave Shakesbear a fiftyfifty

(50/50) chance of recovering.

Dr. Gary L. Petersen, an

orthopedic specialist, felt that Dr. Taylor's x-ray should have
been followed by another x-ray to reach the best diagnosis.

The

orthopedic specialist additionally opined that Shakesbear had urine
burns because he was left sitting in his urine without the ability
to move himself due to his injuries.

The Division found that Dr.

Taylor failed to take sufficient x-rays in diagnosing Shakesbear,
that he did not nurse Shakesbear

8

in a sanitary condition, and

failed to maintain adequate records regarding Shakesbear's history
or conditions.

Findings, p. 8 f 27 to p. 9 f 32 (Appendix 0011-

0012).
8.

Char, a Chinese shar-pei was taken to Dr. Taylor on

October 11, 1994 to be spayed.
the anesthesia well.

Char died because she did not take

Dr. Taylor performed a necropsy and opined

that the dog had died due to an irregularly shaped heart, fluid
around the heart and pneumonia.

A second veterinarian Dr. Scott

Vande Griend performed a necropsy and opined that the heart was not
irregularly shaped and that he could find no edema of the lungs
suggesting pneumonia.

The Division concluded

misdiagnosed the cause of Char's death.

that

Dr. Taylor

Findings, p. 10 5 33-34

(Appendix 0013).
9.

After

setting

forth

its 34 "Findings

of

Fact," each

addressing Dr. Taylor's involvement with the various animals in
question, the Division made several general, conclusory statements
without reference to its Findings or the Record.

(See Findings,

pp. 2-10, Appendix 0005-0013)
10.

Commencing

on page

13 of the Findings

of

Fact, the

Division undertook to define "negligence", "gross negligence" and
"gross incompetence." See Findings pp. 13-16 (Appendix 0016-0019).
11.

Completing

negligence"
determination

and

its

"gross

definition

of

incompetence"

of unprofessional

"negligence",
in

the

context

conduct, the Division,

9

"gross
of

without

more, concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly incompetent in using a
galvanized rod and chromic gut in stabilizing Oscar's fractured
leg, see Findings, p. 16; that Dr. Taylor was grossly incompetent
in

only

palpating

condition, see

Hillary

in

the

course

of

diagnosing

her

Findings p. 16; and, that Dr. Taylor was grossly

incompetent in diagnosing Shakesbear's condition without adequate
x-rays and in making an unsubstantiated prognosis.

See Findings,

p. 17 (Appendix 0020).
12.

The Division also concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly

negligent "with respect to the treatment he provided every animal";
in his treatment of Oscar; as he failed

to take an x-ray

in

diagnosing Hillary's pregnancy and in releasing the dog without
adequate diagnosis and treatment; was grossly negligent in failing
to take adequate x-rays of Shakesbear in diagnosing the dog, and in
providing inadequate nursing observation and maintaining Shakesbear
in

a

sanitary

environment;

and,

was

misdiagnosing the cause of Char's death.

grossly

negligent

in

See Findings, pp. 18-19

(Appendix 0021-0022).
13.

The Division concluded

that Dr. Taylor

engaged

in a

repeated pattern of negligence in failing to record the medical
histories,

the

surgical

reports,

the

progress

diagnoses of Oscar, Nadia, Hillary and Shakesbear.
(Appendix 0020-0021).

10

notes
Id.,

and

the

pp. 17-18

14.

The Division continued in its Findings that there were

"numerous aggravating factors which should be considered regarding
the disciplinary

sanction to

be

Findings, p. 18 (Appendix 0021).

imposed

in this

proceeding.11

These factors were set forth as

Dr. Taylor's "multiple instances" of unprofessional conduct which
supposedly reflected "an inability to provide minimal acceptable
veterinary care or a callous indifference to the condition and
needs of those animals,"

Id.;

Dr. Taylor's uniform refusal "to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct to either this
Board or any of the owners," Findings, p. 19 (Appendix 0022); Dr.
Taylor's

failure

to

maintain

ongoing

compliance

with

those

professional standards which generally govern all veterinarians in
the state," Jd. at 19; and the absence of evidence that Dr. Taylor,
"undertook any good faith efforts to make restitution or rectify
the consequences of his misconduct."
15.

Jd.

Based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

the panel recommended, and the Division adopted the order, that Dr.
Taylor's license be revoked.
see

also

See Findings, p. 20 (Appendix 0023);

April 15, 1996 Order of the Division, Director J. Craig

Jackson, (Appendix 0024).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The

Division's

incompetent

conclusion

that

Dr.

Taylor

was

in his treatment of Hillary and Shakesbear

grossly
is not

supported by substantial evidence as required by Utah Code Ann.

11

§ 63-46b-16(4)(g).

No individual or expert testified that Dr.

Taylor's

conduct

in handling

extreme

deficiency

and

the

those

basic

two

animals manifested

knowledge

and

skill

an

in the

treatment of these animals by Dr. Taylor.
Similarly, the conclusion by the Board

that Dr. Taylor's

treatment of Hillary, Shakesbear and misdiagnosis of the cause of
Char's death amounted to gross negligence, is not supported by the
evidence, nor was the evidentiary finding sufficiently linked to
the ultimate

conclusion

of

law

of

the

Division.

No

witness

testified, nor did any document indicate that the conduct of Dr.
Taylor

was

indifference,

of

such

utter

an

aggravated

forgetfulness,

nature
or

as

heedless

to

manifest

and

palpable

violation of a legal duty or legal obligation.
The Board also inappropriately considered, what it defined as
"aggravating factors11 which it considered in the imposition of the
sanction and revocation of Dr. Taylor's license.
were

not

supported

by

the

substantial

These factors

evidence,

and

their

consideration violates Dr. Taylor's due process and constitutes an
unlawful application of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Finally, the sanction and revocation of Dr. Taylor's license
is contrary

to the Division's prior

practice

veterinary licenses and was not appropriately

in dealing

with

justified by the

Division by explanation of fair and rational bases, as required
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(iii). The Division's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order is devoid of any
explanation of fair and rational bases for the revocation of Dr.
Taylor's license as compared to the prior conduct considered and
12

acted upon by the Division.

Prior licensees have engaged in abuse

and misprescription of controlled substances, and in one instance
criminal fraud, and yet no prior veterinarian has had his license
revoked.
The matter should be reversed and remanded to enter Findings
and Conclusions based on the record

and to

impose a sanction

consistent with the prior practice of the Division,
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DIVISION HAS REVOKED DR. TAYLORS LICENSE BASED UPON
DETERMINATIONS OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
One of the bases by which a substantially prejudiced party can

obtain relief under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, lfUAPA,f,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-0.5

et seq.

, is if the conclusions of fact

and law entered by the administrative agency are not supported "by
substantial evidence when viewed
before the court. . ."

in light of the whole record

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) .

Dr.

Taylor, a practicing veterinarian for over 40 years, has had his
licensed
Whether

revoked
or

not

determinations

as
the

a

consequence
findings

of

of

the

the

Division's

Agency

of fact which are not supported

are
by

action.

based

on

substantial

evidence is determined by examining the entire record available to
the court, not simply that which supports the findings of the
administrative law judge.
Comm'n

of

Utah,

850 P.2d

[citations omitted]
1281,

1285

(Utah

petitioner has the burden of marshalling

13

King
App.

v.

Industrial

1993).

The

"all of the evidence

supporting the findings and show[ing] that despite the supporting
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence,
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.11
1285 citing Grace

Drilling

(Utah App, 1989).

Co. v.

Board

of Review,

Id.

at

776 P. 2d 63, 68

The review imposed by the appeals court is not

to be as strict as a de

novo

review or as lenient as the

f,

any

competent evidence" review but "simply accords deference to the
agency where two reasonable, yet conflicting, conclusions could
have been reached."

Id.

Substantial evidence has been defined by the Utah courts as
"that which

a reasonable

support a conclusion.'"
Review,
of

person

King

x

might accept

as

at 1285, citing Stewart

adequate
v.

Board

831 P. 2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Miriam

Review,

Drilling

812 P. 2d 447, 450
Co.

v.

Board

of

Review

(Utah App.

1991)

to
of

v.

Board

(quoting

Grace

at 68)).

In order to fully understand the conclusions reached by the
Division

in this matter,

in addition

to reviewing

the

entire

record, the Court must necessarily interpret issues of general law.
This Court has previously determined that the level of review
afforded agency decisions in interpreting issues of general law is
guided by Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-16(4) (d) .

King

at 1285.

That

is, the court interprets agency decisions of general law "under a
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's
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decision.11

Id.

citing Questar

Pipeline

Co. v. Tax Comm'n,

817 P. 2d

316, 318 (Utah 1991).
With

regard

to

the

license

of

Dr.

Taylor

to

practice

veterinary medicine in the state of Utah, the Division entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which set out to define
"gross incompetence" and "gross negligence" as those terms are used
in the Division's Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2)(g).
The Licensing Act authorizes the Division to revoke, suspend,
restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private reprimand
to, or otherwise act upon the license of any licensee who engages
in "unprofessional conduct". Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2) (a) (1993
as amended).

As applied to the action brought against the license

of Dr. Taylor, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2) defines unprofessional
conduct to include:
(b) Violating . . . any generally accepted
professional or ethical standard applicable to
an occupation or profession regulated under
this title;

(g)
Practicing . . .
an occupation or
profession regulated under this Title through
gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a
pattern of incompetency or negligence.
In order to take the first step in revoking the license of Dr.
Taylor, it was necessary for the Division to define unprofessional
conduct, and specifically "gross incompetence", "gross negligence"
and

"pattern of negligence."

"Negligence" has been

15

generally

defined by the Utah courts as "a failure to exercise the degree of
care with which a reasonable person would have exercised under the
same circumstances whether by acting or by failing to act."

DCR,

Inc.

In a

v. Peak

Alarm

Co.,

663 P.2d 433, 434-35 (Utah 1983).

criminal context, the Utah courts have defined criminal negligence
to occur when a person engages in conduct, under circumstances when
he

was

aware

or

ought

to

be

aware

of

a

substantial

and

unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur.

The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the

failure to perceive

it constitutes a gross deviation

from the

standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
circumstances as viewed from the actor's stand point.
Singer,

815 P.2d 1303, 1312 fn. 5 (Utah App. 1991).

State

v.

In the realm

of medical malpractice in order to sustain a prima facie case of
negligence, a plaintiff must show three elements, " (1) the standard
of care by which the doctor's conduct is to be measured, (2) breach
of that standard by the doctor, and (3) injury proximately caused
by the doctor's negligence."

Dikeou

(Utah App. 1994) citing Chadwick
(Utah App. 1988).

v.
v.

Osborne,
Neilsen,

881 P.2d 943, 946
763 P. 2d 817, 821

Utah courts have not defined

"negligence",

"gross negligence", or "gross incompetence" in the context of a
license revocation proceeding.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Division
defined negligence as

"the

failure to use the degree of

16

care

required

under

the

particular

circumstances

involved."

See

Findings, p. 15 (Appendix 0018).
Although the Utah Supreme Court has concluded
negligence

falls on a continuum of culpability

that gross

between

simple

negligence and intentional conduct, and involves elements of both
(citing Strange

v. Osterlund,

there

Utah

are

no

negligence

in

proceedings,"

a

cases

594 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1979)), since
defining

professional

the

Division

setting

looked

articulating a definition of both.
"Gross

issues

to

of

"competency

relative
other

to

and

licensure

jurisdictions

in

Findings, p. 14.

incompetence" was defined

by

the

Division

as

"an

extreme deficiency in the basic knowledge and skills necessary to
practice at the minimum degree of necessary technical expertise or
ability."

[citations omitted] Division's Findings, p. 14.

It

defined "gross negligence" as substantially and appreciably higher
in magnitude than ordinary negligence, conduct of an aggravated
character as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary
care.

See Division's Findings, p. 15.

In relying on case law from

other jurisdictions, the Division used such descriptive terms and
phrases as "indifference to present legal duty," "forgetfulness of
legal obligations,"

"heedless

and palpable

violation

of

legal

duty," and then noted that one body of case law defines "gross
negligence" in terms of degree, and not kind, while other courts
and jurisdictions have defined "gross negligence" in terms of the

17

Id.

kind of negligence, and not degree.
this Court in the Strange

at 15-16.

decision, makes it clear that Utah courts

have defined "gross negligence11 in terms of degree.
881.

The language of

See Strange

at

The Division falls short in its Order in setting forth the

elements required

of the Division

in establishing

a claim of

"negligence", "gross negligence" or "gross incompetence" against
Dr. Taylor.

The Division did not expound on what the Division, in

the context of a licensing action, must show in order to prove a
prima facie case. Nor did the Division provide a reasoned basis or
an explanation of the linkage between its Findrngs of Fact and its
ultimate Conclusions.

The absence of this link is critical to the

Divisions analysis since, without it, it is impossible to pinpoint
precisely what standards are required in the industry and under the
provisions of the Licensing Act, and to what extent they have been
violated, if at all, by Dr. Taylor.

This deficiency is precisely

the problem addressed by the Utah Supreme Court recently, in the
yet unpublished opinion of In re:

Richard

Worthen,

No. 95053 6 and

950537, a portion of the text of which is attached hereto in the
Appendix, (Appendix 0027) where the court observed
We expect the Commission's Findings to resolve
questions of fact and provide an explanation
of its assessment of the facts so as to
provide a reasoned basis for its decision.
There must be an explanation of the linkage
between the raw facts and the Commission's
ultimate conclusions, including an explanation
of why the Commission drew the inferences from
the facts that it did.
Finally, the
Commission must logically link its factual

18

findings
and
legal
conclusions
to
the
recommended sanction order to explain why it
chose one sanction over another.
Id.

at p. 29.

This the Division here failed to do.

After defining negligence as set forth above, the Division
merely concluded that Dr. Taylor's failure to "record a medical
history or his physical examination
surgery report . . . ,lf;
and, " . . .

M

. . ."; "to record an adequate

. . . to record progress notes. . . ";

to record a diagnosis. . . " o f Oscar, Hillary Nadia

and Shakesbear, four of the five dogs treated giving rise to the
complaints against Dr. Taylor, constituted "^ repeated pattern of
negligence . . . "

See Findings, pp. 17-18 (Appendix 0020-0021).

After citing the language of the various jurisdictions, as if
by way of guideline, and without further rational, the Division
merely concludes that, "[r]espondent

[Dr. Taylor] has practiced

veterinary medicine

in both a grossly

incompetent

negligence manner."

Findings, p. 16 (Appendix 0019).

and

A.

NO EVIDENCE OF GROSS INCOMPETENCE IN DR.
TAYLORS TREATMENT OF HILLARY AND SHAKESBEAR.

The

evidence

elicited

at

hearing

does

Division's conclusions in several respects.

not

grossly

support

the

Among other things,

the Division concluded that Dr. Taylor was "grossly incompetent" in
his treatment of the dog Hillary, "when he elected to only palpate
the dog as the sole means to diagnose her condition."

The Division

also concluded that Dr. Taylor was "grossly incompetent" in his
treatment of Shakesbear, "when he diagnosed that dog's condition
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without resort to any adequate x-rays" and suggested that the dog
be euthanized.
1.

Findings, p. 16 (Appendix 0019).
Evidence of Treatment of Hillary.

The Division's claim based on the dog Hillary was supported by
the

testimony

of

Hillary's

owner,

Ms.

Cindy

Bue,

and

the

veterinarian Ms. Bue visited subsequent to taking her dog to the
Brookside Animal Hospital, Dr. Mayling M. Chinn, which spans pages
150-215 of the transcript (Appendix 0212-0229) .

Hillary was an

English bulldog, which, according to the Findings of the Division,
was artificially inseminated by Dr. Taylor on April 21, and 23 of
1994.

See Transcript, 155:15-21 (Appendix 0214).

On Friday, June

17, 1994, Hillary went into labor and her owner, Ms. Bue, contacted
the Brookside Animal Hospital to take in Hillary.
157:6-23 (Appendix 0214).
delivered

all

of her

See

Transcript

Ultimately, Hillary went into labor and

pups

stillborn.

Two

of

the

pups were

delivered before the animal was brought into the Brookside Animal
Clinic.

Ms. Bue testified that, at Brookside, Dr. Taylor "felt her

stomach,11 examined the puppy that was stillborn and explained that
the puppies were all premature, that Hillary was passing them fine
by

herself

and

no

cesarian

Transcript, 161:5 - 162:15

section

would

(Appendix 0215).

be

required.

See

Hillary, in fact,

passed other puppies while at the Brookside Animal Clinic but Ms.
Bue ultimately became impatient and came down and picked up her
dog.

See

Transcript 162:16 - 167:6 (Appendix 0215-0217).

20

Ms. Bue

then took Hillary home where her labor continued.
168:4 - 170 (Appendix 0217).
Id*

See Transcript

Hillary bore another stillborn pup.

Being unable to contact Brookside, Ms. Bue contacted the

Central Valley Hospital and Dr. Chinn and took Hillary to that
clinic where Dr. Chinn took x-rays, determined there were still
puppies unborn and performed a c-section on Hillary, removing the
last of the stillborn puppies.
(Appendix 0218-0219).

In her

See Transcript
testimony,

172:14 - 177:2

Dr. Chinn

testified

about her treatment of Hillary and interactions with Cindy Bue.
Her testimony spanned from page 189 through page 212
0222-0228).

(Appendix

In response to the propriety of palpating an English

bulldog to determine the number and size of the litter, Dr. Chinn
responded,
A:
Palpation is always something you do on
an exam.
However, on many dogs, especially
larger breed dogs or the anatomy of a bulldog
can be difficult to palpate and determine
number of puppies or if there are even
puppies. It can be very difficult to do that.
Q:
So would it
radiograph to-.

be

appropriate

to

do

a

A:
Yeah. Yeah, radiography is the only way
to determine first like pregnancy and then
trying to determine the number of puppies.
But even a radiograph may not tell you the
exact number of puppies if there is a large
litter, all the puppies on top of each other.
See Transcript, 193:22 to 194:10 (Appendix 0223).
In conclusion of her direct testimony, the following exchange
took place:
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Q:
Do you have an opinion about the standard
of care that Dr. Taylor provided for Hillary?
A:
As far as the medical history or just
overall?
Q:
Well, based upon your review of the
medical history and what Ms. Bue told you, do
you have an opinion as to the standard of care
that Dr. Taylor provided for Hillary?
A:
I think initially in my opinion and also
what
is
substantiated
in
our
current
veterinary texts that a thorough physical
examination as well as performing at least an
abdominal radiograph would have been helpful
to assess the nature for Hillary.
Q:
Based upon what you know tha1^~ is that
there was no radiograph performed by Dr.
Taylor, did the standard of care that he
provided for Hillary fall below the accepted
standard?
A:
From the information that I have, I feel
that it did.
See Transcript 204:14 to 205:7 (Appendix 0226).
There is no further testimony from Dr. Chinn or any other
veterinarian to the effect that Dr. Taylor's failure to palpate
Hillary or take a radiograph constituted

ff

an extreme deficiency in

basic knowledge and skill", that is, gross incompetence as defined
by the Division.

Further, by comparing what the Utah courts have

required in establishing a prima facie case in medical malpractice
cases, see

Dikeou

v.

Osborne,

881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah App. 1994),

there was no evidence offered by the Division of "the standard of
care by which the doctor's conduct is to be measured," or that
injury ensued proximately caused by Dr. Taylor's negligence.
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See

supra.

The evidence provided by the Agency did not satisfy the

prima facie requirements typically recognized in this Court in a
malpractice context, much less a finding of gross incompetence, as
that term has been defined by the Division and courts of other
jurisdictions.
2.
The

Evidence of Treatment of Shakesbear.

Division

also

concluded

incompetent "when he diagnosed

that

Dr. Taylor

was

grossly

[Shakesbear7s] condition without

resort to any adequate x-rays" and suggested the dog be euthanized.
Findings, at p. 17 (Appendix 0020).

Shakesbear was a male chow-

chow that fell off a twelve-foot porch, injured its back and was
taken to the Brookside Animal Hospital on May
Transcript 77:2 - 78:17 (Appendix 0194).
and

taking

euthanized.

one x-ray,

brother

See

After examining the chow

suggested

that

the

chow

be

See Transcript 77:19 - 78:17 and 87:8, 89:3 (Appendix

0194; 0196-0197).
the

Dr. Taylor

24, 1994.

of

Seeking a second opinion, Alvin Dean Schofield,
Shakesbear's

Shakesbear to Dr. Gary Petersen.

owner,

took

the

half-paralyzed

On the stand, after reviewing the

radiograph taken by the Brookside Animal Clinic and Dr. Taylor, Dr.
Petersen testified
A:
This is a radiograph of what appears to
be a dog, spinal x-ray primarily showing from
about the ninth or tenth-eighth or ninth rib
down to the level of the pelvis in generally
what would be considered a dorsal/ventral or
ventral/dorsal view.
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Q:
Do you have an opinion as to whether any
of the disks along that spinal column are
misaligned or out of position?
A:
Based on this radiograph, I can't define
any of them that are necessarily misaligned,
no. There is some rotation of the spine. It
tips (indicating), so it isn't an ideal view.
Usually we see two views at the very least to
make any determination of any sort. But based
on what I'm seeing here, I cannot see obvious
misalignment.
Q:
You indicated that usually you see two
views.
Would it be appropriate for further
radiographs to be taken to make a diagnosis?
A:

In my opinion yes.

See Transcript 107:21 - 108:14 (Appendix 0202).
On cross-examination, Dr. Petersen testified that he has a
specialty interest in neurology, although he is not a specialist in
neurology.

He was then asked
Q:
Do all veterinarians have the same
gualifications in that direction that you do?
A:

No, I don't believe so.

There is no further testimony given with respect to x-rays in the
diagnosis

of

these

types

of

injuries.

Notably

there

is

no

testimony given of the veterinary standard used in the diagnosis of
spinal injuries, and in particular the use of radiographs in such
diagnoses.

Hence, under the standards typically applied by this

Court in the medical malpractice arena, the Division failed to put
on a prima facie case of negligence.

Much more, there is no

evidence that Dr. Taylor's failure to take a second x-ray manifests
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an extreme deficiency in basic knowledge and skill in the practice
of veterinary medicine•

The best testimony which the Division

could rely on in reaching its conclusion is that Dr. Petersen,
"usually

we

see

two

determination of any
0202).

views
sort."

at

the

very

least

See Transcript

to

make

108:7-8

any

(Appendix

The Agency's conclusion that Dr. Taylor's conduct in the

treatment of Hillary and Shakesbear constituted gross incompetence
is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record.
0002).

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(g)

(Appendix

This deficiency in the evidence was apparently recognized

by counsel in his opening and closing statement when he stated,
"That's important to remember because we're really talking about
malpractice
malpractice.

here,

the

fact

that

Dr.

Taylor

has

engaged

in

And any time that happens, we have someone who feels

like they've been damaged through that malpractice
Transcript 19:22 - 20:1 (Appendix 0180).

. . .If

And continued in his

closing
It's the Division's position that it has
presented evidence to you that Dr. Taylor has
acted in a pattern of negligence. We have at
least four cases here and all five of them,
this is true, Dr. Taylor fell below the
standard of care.
And that's the legal
definition of negligence, so we have a
pattern.
We also have a case here that
involves gross negligence.
And that's the
Oscar case.
Remember, that's an extreme
departure from the standard of care. And it
was Dr. Smith's opinion that Dr. Taylor
engaged in an extreme departure from the
standard of care [in treating Oscar]. . .
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See

See

Transcript 494:5-15 (Appendix 0303).
B.

NO EVIDENCE OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN DR. TAYLOR'S TREATMENT
OF HILLARY, SHAKESBEAR AND CHAR.

Similarly, the evidence which came in during the hearing does
not support the Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor was grossly
negligent,

as that term has been defined

by

the Division, in

several respects.
1.

Evidence of Treatment of Hillary.

The Division concluded that Dr. Taylor, "was grossly negligent
when

he

took

Hillary's
without

no

x-ray

condition

adequate

(Appendix 0020).

to

accurately

and when

diagnosis

he

and

improperly

adequately
released

treatment.11

and

diagnose
that

Findings,

p.

dog
17

The sum total of the direct testimony given upon

which the Division relied in reaching its conclusion is set forth
above in the discussion of gross incompetence.

Dr. Mayling M.

Chinn, the expert relied on by the Division in putting on its case,
did not testify whatsoever

as to the propriety

releasing Hillary when he did.

of

Dr. Taylor

Further, her testimony as to her

overall impressions of Dr. Taylor's treatment, and whether that
treatment met any standard, is set forth in full text above.

The

testimony elicited does not even satisfy any sort of a prima facie
showing of negligence, much less prove conduct of an aggravated
character, substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than
ordinary negligence, manifesting an indifference to present legal
duty, forgetfulness of legal obligations or a heedless and palpable
26

violation

of

negligence.

legal
The

duty,

as

evidence

the

at

Division

hearing

has

does

not

defined

gross

support

the

Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor was grossly negligent in his
treatment of Hillary.
2.

Evidence of Treatment of Shakesbear.

The Division concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly negligent
in his treatment of Shakesbear as he failed to "take an adequate xray to accurately diagnose the condition of that dog" and "failed
to provide adequate nursing observation and care as to maintain
Shakesbear in a sanitary environment."

Findings, p. 17 (Appendix

0020) . The sum total of any evidence which came in at the hearing
which can even remotely be construed to support a finding of a
standard and a breach of that standard with respect to supposed
inadequate x-rays is set forth in toto

above.

The statement of Dr.

Gary Petersen that in his opinion it would be "appropriate for
further

radiographs

to be taken

to make

a diagnosis"

is not

adequate under Utah law or under the cases cited by the Division in
articulating a definition of gross negligence, to support such a
finding with respect to Dr. Taylor's diagnosis of Shakesbear.

See

Transcript 107:21 to 108:14 (Appendix 0202) cited and set forth

supra.
In regard to the Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor failed
to provide adequate nursing observation and maintain Shakesbear in
a

sanitary

environment,

the

following

27

evidence

was

elicited.

First, Alvin Dean Schofield, Shakesbear's owner's brother, who was
present when the dog was injured and took the injured animal to the
Brookside Animal Hospital, testified that after being advised by
Dr. Taylor that Shakesbear ought to be euthanized he concluded that
he wanted a second opinion.
(Appendix

0197).

See Transcript, 88:22 through 89:20

Mr. Schofield went to the Brookside

Animal

Hospital to pick up the dog and then was asked to describe what he
saw as Shakesbear was brought outside the clinic to his car.
A:
Well, I drove my truck around there to
the back where I'd guess they had this garage
that they keep them in. It was all cement.
And when he'd [Dr. Taylor] broughten (sic)
Shakesbear out, I mean, he just reeked of
urine so bad it was ungodly. And the thing
that amazed me the most is when he did bring
him out, he held Shakesbear by the tail to
hold up his hind quarters.
And it looked
like, you know, he was wet so they had like
squirted him off just before they had brought
him out. I wrapped him up in a blanket and
put him in the truck. And that's when I drove
him directly over to Town and Country.
In State's Exhibit "10", a letter prepared by Mr. Schofield dated
September 28, 1994, over four months after Shakesbear was taken to
the Brookside Animal Hospital, Mr. Schofield described, "Shakesbear
was brought in a room in the blanket I had brought him in with, he
was muzzled
Shakesbear

and smelled
from

the

of urine.ff

Brookside

described in his letter,

Animal

See

Hospital,

Mr.

Schofield

ff

[w]hen he came out, Shakesbear was wet

and smelled extremely bad like urine.
water . . . "

When he came to pick up

He had squirted him off with

State's Exhibit "10", R 327.
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In response to the examination of one of the board members,
Mr. Sperry, Mr, Schofield responded as follows:
Q:
When you had the dog at Dr. Petersen's
clinic, was it catheterized the whole time it
was there? Do you know?
A:
As far as I know, I'd taken the dog in
there and gotten his—left it there until he
gave me a prognosis on it. And from that time
on, I think he had said that it would have to
be catheterized and it was. When I next saw
the dog, he'd been shaved where all the burns
were and he was washed up because he reeked of
urine so bad.
I mean, I had to throw the
blanket out.
The thing was just ungodly
because of the urine smell on it. But he was,
I would say, twice to ten times better care of
him. I mean, he was clean.
See

Transcript 97:20 through 98:8 (Appendix 0199).
Dr. Petersen, the veterinarian who saw Shakesbear after it had

been removed from the Brookside Clinic testified in regard to the
condition of Shakesbear when presented at his clinic as follows:
Q:
Could you tell the Board what you
observed when you examined Shakesbear on May
26, 1994?
A:
Yes. The dog was brought in paralyzed in
the rear legs, unable to move his rear legs.
It's rear end was soggy with urine, and the
dog smelled of urine. The towel he was in was
actually damp with what appeared to be urine.

There was a severe urine scald over the
scrotum and thighs on both thighs of the dog.
The hair was just all matted and sectioned in
that soggy urine moisture.
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Q:
What would be the type of appropriate
nursing care for an animal that was in
Shakesbear's condition?
A:
The dog certainly should have been
catheterized to relieve that urine to drain
bladder at least intermittently to prevent the
urine scalding, raised on a rack or adapter
that would allow the urine to drip away from
the dog and not remain in contact with the
dog's skin. If the hair became saturated, the
hair would need to be shaved off so it just
doesn't go into that urine moisture.

Q:
Do you have an opinion as to the type of
nursing care that was provided for Shakesbear?
A:
In my opinion, it did not appear that
this dog had received any care as far as
treating this urine burn at all.
Q:
In your opinion, did the care it received
fall below the standard of care?
A:
See

In my opinion, yes.

Transcript, 103:9 through 105:2 (Appendix 0201).
While all the evidence submitted could reasonably be construed

to support a conclusion of negligence, with respect to the nursing
and observation provided Shakesbear by Dr. Taylor and Brookside
Animal

Hospital,

negligence.

it

does

not

support

a

conclusion

of

gross

There is no evidence that Dr. Taylor's conduct was of

an aggravated character, substantially and appreciably higher in
magnitude from ordinary negligence.
0018).

See

Findings, p. 15 (Appendix

There is no evidence of indifference, forgetfulness or

heedless and palpable violation

30

of any sort of

legal duty

or

obligation.

Id.

Hence, the Division's conclusion that the nursing

care provided Shakesbear by Dr. Taylor amounted to gross negligence
is not supported by the evidence of record.
Moreover, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that
the sanitary condition of the Brookside Animal Clinic facility fell
below any articulated standard, much less was so far below as to be
considered

aggravated

in

character,

or

substantially

appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence.
the theme of the Brookside

Animal

Clinic

being

an

and
While

unsanitary

facility was introduced in the opening statement, the only evidence
which could even remotely be argued to support such a conclusion is
that with respect to the condition of Shakesbear, noted above, the
testimony of Dr. Taylor, and that of Lori Larsen, an investigator
for the Division.

Dr. Taylor testified as follows:

Q:
One of the Division's allegations is that
your facilities are unsanitary.
A:
Yeah. In a previous statement that was
given by Lori Larsen that she answered the
question of why she wrote that we have an
unsanitary facility is that she saw a loose
cat in the office. And the other one was that
there was a dog that had urine stains on it
and moist eczema; that she testified that it
had all that urine burn and moist eczema. And
what had taken place on the dog, any time you
have damaged tissue on a dog, sometimes it
takes about three days or four days before it
starts to separate and to die and actually
fall away.
Q:
During the investigation of you which
took over a year, did anybody ever come out
from the Board of Health or from the Division
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or anybody else come out and inspect your
facilities out there for sanitation or other
purposes?
A:
No.
No, and I might further comment,
maybe I shouldn't, but in what she wrote up in
that
report
saying
we
are
dirty
and
unsanitary, I challenged her on that, that she
could go out to other facilities without being
announced and compare.
See

Transcript 346:20 through 347:17 (Appendix 0265).
Dr. Taylor further testified in response to the questions of

panel members:
Dr. Rees:
Yes.
There were some questions
raised about sanitation, that sort of thing.
And was Shakesbear bathed?
Was he ever
bathed? This is the dog with the paralysis.
A:
Certainly they were cleaned up night and
morning and put on clean towels or blankets.
And you know as well as I, some of those cats
that have FUS, that you have to put them on
crates. And we do have a grate that we keep
dogs on. A lot of times they'll crawl off the
grate if they're in a big enough area, not in
a small enclosure.
Dr. [Denzel E. ] Taylor: You offered to have
the dog cleaned up before Mr. Schofield took
it home?
The witness:
I certainly did. I offered to
have him come back and get it or whatever. We
did not have some help there until later, and
we bathe it and clean the dog up before he
took it home. And he said, M Oh, no, he'd take
it." That was fine.
Dr. [Denzel E.] Taylor: Do you clean kennels
night and morning?
Is that part of the
routine at the hospital?
A:

Right.
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See

Transcript 398:24 through 399:21 (Appendix 0278).
Finally,

respect

to

Lori

the

Larsen

sanitary

testified
conditions

on
of

cross-examination
the

Brookside

with

Animal

Hospital:
Q:
You were out at the hospital on three,
four different occasions. You are the one who
signed the Petition against Dr. Taylor, are
you not?
A:

Yes, I am.

Q:
And in it you made allegations of
unsanitary conditions and various other sorts
of allegations. Let me ask you this, did you
at any time during your investigation" ever ask
to see the operating room or where the kennels
are, where the dogs are kept, any of the
sterilization equipment or did you ask to go
through the hospital?

(Objection made and ruled upon)

Q:
(by Mr. Dahl) Let me ask you this.
you ever go through the hospital?

Did

A:

No, I didn't take a tour of the hospital.

Q:

And why not?

A:
Well, I didn't need to. I wasn't there
to inspect the hospital. I was there to talk
with Dr. Taylor about the various allegations
and get his perspective on each of them.
See

Transcript, 466:13 through 467:14 (Appendix 0296).
Upon the examination of one of the board members, Mr. Sperry,

Lori Larsen responded as follows:
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Q:
And you did not physically inspect the
operation of Dr. Taylor's at all.
You just
were in his front reception area and the
office area?
A:
That's correct.
I signed the Petition
which contains all of the allegations, but the
allegations
are
based
on
all
of
the
information
that's
been
gathered.
So
allegations
of
unsanitary
conditions
or
unprofessional conduct are all based on the
testimony of all the witnesses. And I signed
the Petition for the investigating officer,
but I did not inspect the facility myself.
See Transcript 470:22 to 471:7 (Appendix 0297).
On redirect, Ms. Larsen was led by the Division's counsel as
follows:
Q:
Mrs. Larsen, maybe we can clarify the
issues of sanitary conditions.
Is it true
that the allegations of unsanitary conditions
relate to individual animals rather than the
facility itself?
A:

That's correct.

See Transcript 472:9-13

(Appendix 0297).

No further

testimony

exists with respect to the unsanitary nature of the

Brookside

Animal Hospital, or any facility or aspect of the facility operated
by Dr. Taylor.

No evidence was introduced as to sanitation at

other local animal hospitals. The condition of one animal found to
have been treated by Dr. Taylor does not substantially support the
conclusion that the operation, maintenance and overall sanitary
condition of the Brookside Animal Hospital, Dr. Taylor's facility,
was operated below an established degree of care with which a
reasonable person would have exercised under the same circumstances
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c . ."

of DCR, Inc.

1983) .

Nor

does

v.

Peak Alarm

it

support

Co.,
the

663 P. 2d 433, 434-35 (Utah
conclusion

and

finding

of

negligence as that term is defined by the Division in its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
0018) .

See Findings p. 15

(Appendix

It is a far greater leap and an even less substantially

supported conclusion for the Division to have determined that the
sanitary condition of Dr. Taylor's facility was maintained in a
grossly negligent manner.

See Findings, p. 17 (Appendix 0020).

While, at best, substantial evidence may support the conclusion
that Dr. Taylor was negligent in diagnosing and nursing Shakesbear,
there is no evidence in the record which supports a conclusion of
gross negligence with respect to any aspect of Dr. Taylor's care of
Shakesbear or his failure to maintain a sanitary environment.
3.

Evidence of Treatment of Char.

Finally, the Division concludes that Dr. Taylor was grossly
negligent,

"when he misdiagnosed

Findings, p. 17 (Appendix 0020).

the

cause

of

Char's death.11

Char was a shar-pei, owned by

Stephanie Picklesimer, who took Char into Dr. Taylor to get spayed.
See Transcript, 119:1-11 (Appendix 0205).

She was contacted the

next morning and told that Char had not taken the anesthetic well
and had died.

Dr. Taylor suggested he could do an autopsy if Ms.

Picklesimer wanted him to.
Transcript, 119:12-23

She instructed him to proceed.

(Appendix 0205).

After

See

the autopsy was

completed, Dr. Taylor contacted Ms. Picklesimer and told her that
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Char "had pneumonia in both lungs, that she had an irregularly
shaped heart, and there was fluid around the heart.11
through 123:2 (Appendix 0205-0206).
by

the

State's

Picklesimer.

Exhibit

15, a

Id.

p. 122:20

This diagnosis was borne out

letter

from

Dr. Taylor

to Ms.

Not being satisfied, Mr. and Ms. Picklesimer picked

up Char's carcass and took it to the All Pet Complex for another
necropsy.

The All Pet Complex performed a necropsy, informed the

Picklesimers that there was no pneumonia in either lung and Char's
heart was normal.

See Transcript, 128:20 through 129:13 (Appendix

0207) .
The State's expert, Dr. Scott Vande Griend testified that he
conducted the necropsy of Char and, at the conclusion describing
his findings, answered the following questions.
Q:
(By Mr. Allred)
Dr. Vande Griend, are
you familiar with the conclusions of Dr.
Taylor's autopsy?
A:
Yes, I received a copy of that just the
other day. I hadn't seen it until then. At
the time, I just had Mr. Picklesimer's
anecdotal report of pneumonia.
Q:
Do you agree with Dr. Taylor's conclusion
that Char died of pneumonia and an irregularly
shaped heart?
A:

No, I do not.

Q:
In your professional opinion, is there
any excuse for the conclusion that Dr. Taylor
reached when he performed a necropsy on Char?
A:
No, I do not.
In particular, if there
was
suspicion
of
pneumonia,
some
histopathology or microscopic studies should
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have been
disagree.

submitted,

which

were

not.

I

Q:
In your
opinion, did
Dr. Taylor's
conclusions in his necropsy fall below the
standard of care in the profession for
performing a necropsy?
A:

Yes.

See Transcript, 134:17 through 135:12 (Appendix 0208-0209).
On cross-examination, Dr. Vande Griend testified that he could
not conclude from the necropsy what the cause of Char's death was.
He was then asked:
Q:
Let me ask this. Neutering animals is an
almost every day occurrence in veterinary
medicine, is it not?
A:

Yes, very common surgery, uh huh.

Q:
And let me ask you this. Have you ever
performed a surgery of this type and lost an
animal?
A:

Yes, I have.

Q:
So in normal course of events, sometimes
animals die from this procedure?
A:
That is correct.
But in the normal
course of events in necropsy, if there is a
physical finding in necropsy, it's not normal
to report something that's not there.
Q:
So what you do is you have a difference
of opinion with Dr. Taylor?
A:

Exactly.

See Transcript, 136:5-20 (Appendix 0209).

Dr. Vande Griend also

testified that Char's pericardial sac had been opened.
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n

So if

there was any fluid on the heart, I couldn't determine that because
it had leaked out."
Q:

Were there any incisions into the lung?

A:
I can't recall.
I don't believe there
were, but I can't say for certain because I
can't exactly recall.
See Transcript, 143:1-13 (Appendix 0211).
A second expert called by the Division, Dr. Bret Neville,
observed Dr. Vande Griend's necropsy of Char.

He was then shown

Dr. Taylor's conclusions as to the cause of death and asked if he
agreed, to which he responded,
A:
I do not.
I saw no indication of a
pneumonia. The heart appeared to me to be of
normal size and normal consistency and normal
shape and had no indication of fluid around
the heart because, again, it was kind of--the
pericardial sac was cut open.
Q:
Do you have a professional opinion as to
whether it's acceptable to make a misdiagnosis
on this type of necropsy?
A:
Anesthetic deaths or risk are always a
concern
whenever
an
animal
is
under
anesthetic, and that's something that happens
to every veterinarian I know.
There is no
indication of what Dr. Taylor said on the
necropsy, so we still don't have an answer
what caused it.
But I guess I don't
understand why Dr. Taylor said pneumonia and
irregularly shaped heart when there wasn't.
Q:
So is there an excuse for the conclusion
he reached?
A:

None that I can see.
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See Transcript, 148:7 through 149:1 (Appendix 0212).

Again, the

evidence elicited at hearing falls short of supporting the Board's
conclusion

that Dr. Taylor's

necropsy

of

Char

and

postmortem

diagnosis was grossly negligent.
In all, no substantial evidence supports the Board's finding
that Dr. Taylor acted in a grossly incompetent or grossly negligent
way

in the treating

diagnosis of Char.

of Hillary, Shakesbear

or

the

postmortem

At the very best, the findings of the Board

which are supported by substantial evidence

include an extreme

departure in the care given one animal, Oscajr, and negligence on
behalf of Dr. Taylor and the Brookside Animal Hospital staff in his
treatment

of

maintaining

one
of

animal, Shakesbear,

medical

records

of

and

animal

in

the

keeping

histories,

and

medical

procedures, progress notes, and diagnoses of four animals.

These

findings were made as to a veterinarian who has practiced in the
state

for

sanction.
19

approximately

forty

years

with

no

prior

discipline

See Transcript, 316:20-24 (Appendix 0257), Findings, p.

(Appendix 0022).

Yet based on

its findings, the

Division

imposed its most severe penalty allowed under the Act, that of
revocation. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2) (a) (1993 as amended).
The conclusion of the Division and imposition of the penalty of
revocation in this case is unprecedented and not at all reasonably
explained by the Division in its Findings and Conclusions.
Argument,

infra.
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See

C.

THE DIVISION'S FINDING OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS AND CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

In its final analysis of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of

Law,

the

aggravating

Division

factors

concluded

which

should

that
be

M

[t]here

considered

are

regarding

disciplinary sanction to be imposed in this proceeding."
p. 18 (Appendix 021).
(1) multiple

numerous
the

Findings,

Those so-called "aggravating factors" are

instances of unprofessional conduct which

reflect

either an inability to provide minimally acceptable veterinary care
or a callous indifference to the condition and needs of those
animals, Id.;

(2) Dr. Taylor's uniform refusal to acknowledge the

wrongful nature of his misconduct to either the Board or any of the
owners of animals in question, Findings, p. 19 (Appendix 0022) ; (3)
Dr. Taylor's inexcusable failure to "maintain ongoing compliance"
with

professional

veterinarians
evidence

in the

standards

which

State, Id.;

and

generally
(4) that

govern
there

is,

all
"no

[Dr. Taylor] undertook any good faith efforts to make

restitution or rectify the consequences of his misconduct."

Id.

No evidence supports this Finding of the Division of "aggravated
factors."

Moreover, the imposition by the Division of item nos.

(2) and (4) above violates Dr. Taylor's due process and constitutes
an unlawful decision making process or a failure to
prescribed procedure.

follow a

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (e) (1988

as amended).
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1.

Multiple
instances of
unprofessional
conduct reflecting inability to provide
minimally acceptable veterinary care or
callous indifference to the conditions
and needs of animals.

The record before the Court does not support this conclusion.
Relevant portions of the record and the evidence elicited below
upon which such conclusions can be based are more fully set forth
in the arguments above.

As was recognized by counsel for the

Division in his closing statement, at best the record
supports the conclusion that Dr. Taylor and his
negligent in the handling of five animals.

evidence

facility were

In treating one of

those animals, Oscar, according to the State's expert, Dr. Dale
Smith, Dr. Taylor's conduct was an extreme departure
accepted standard of practice.
0247).

from the

See Transcript, 276:1-20 (Appendix

There was no evidence below of Dr. Taylor being indifferent

or callous as to the needs of the animals he treated.

Nor is there

evidence that Dr. Taylor "inexcusably failed to maintain ongoing
compliance"

with

the

professional

veterinarians in the state.
The

evidence

was

that

standards

which

govern

all

See Findings, p. 19 (Appendix 0022).

Dr. Taylor

had

seen

somewhere

in

the

neighborhood of 40,000 animals during the time period in question,
and only five of those animals gave rise to the complaint set forth
in the Division's Petition.

There was no other testimony

or

documentary evidence that Dr. Taylor's conduct permeated his entire
practice, extended beyond the five animals in question or in any
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way impacted any other animals.

As if to rebut Mrs, Taylor's and

Dr.

the

Taylor's

customers,

testimony

counsel

as

for the

to

number

Division

of

in his

other

satisfied

closing

statement

inappropriately stated, without reference to, or reliance on, any
evidence before the Division,
The reason that five cases have appeared in
this case is a question of time. We've been
here two and a half days, and we've gone over
five incidences (sic).
It's true that Dr.
Taylor has treated a large number of animals.
It's also true that the Division had more
complaints than these five.
The Division
selected the five strongest complaints that
would show a pattern of negligence and, in one
instance, a case of gross negligence.
It's
not necessary to put on every complaint that's
brought to the Division's attention.
Just
like it's not necessary if someone is charged
with bank robbery to put on evidence of every
bank they didn't rob, it's not necessary for
the Division to put on evidence of satisfied
customers. All that's important is that the
conduct that Dr. Taylor engaged in constitutes
either simple negligence or gross negligence.
See Transcript 504:6-24
that

Dr.

question.

Taylor's

(Appendix 0305).

conduct

extended

No evidence suggested

beyond

these

animals

in

No evidence indicated Dr. Taylor was indifferent or

callous toward the needs of the animals.

It is only counsel for

the Division's inappropriate statement, which is not evidence, upon
which the Division could rely to reach its conclusion with respect
to aggravation of Dr. Taylor's conduct.
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2.

Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of
Misconduct To the Board or Owners, No
Evidence of Good Faith Efforts to Make
Restitution or Rectify Consequences of
Misconduct.

No evidence supports the conclusion by the Division that Dr.
Taylor's conduct was aggravated by his failure to acknowledge the
wrongful

nature or to undertake good

efforts

rectify the consequences of his misconduct.

to restitute

or

The only statements

made in the transcript which could directly support such conclusion
are the statements of counsel for the Division

in his closing

argument, which statements are notably not fact. Counsel proceeds:
Revocation is a serious thing, as I'm
sure you can understand. We're talking about
taking away the license of a veterinarian,
taking away his ability to earn a livelihood.
And revocation isn't asked for from the
Division very lightly. In this case, we have
a situation where Dr. Taylor has not accepted
responsibility for any of these incidents. As
you review the evidence, I think you'll see
that Dr. Taylor has in each instance blamed
someone else for the conduct involved here to
one degree or another, some more egregious
than others when you look at who he has blamed
and who he has pointed the finger at.
Dr. Taylor really
anything. . . .

hasn't

owned

up

See Transcript, 494:23 through 495:1- (Appendix 0303).

to
Counsel for

the Division then continues in his reply:
You know, I have feelings just like
anyone else. And when Mr. Dahl said that Dr.
Taylor's daughter is going to veterinary
college and hopes to join Dr. Taylor within a
year, I have the same reaction you probably
have. That would be nice. But Dr. Taylor has
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never had the attitude during this entire case
or in the investigation before this case that
he wanted to work something out.
That's
because he has never taken responsibility for
what's occurred here. And the Division felt
that it was importcint for you to hear the
evidence so that you could decide if there's a
risk to the public here. . . . This does not
seem to be an individual who can be retrained
or reeducated in his practice. It seems to be
an individual who just won't own up to the
conduct that I believe has proved by a
preponderance of that evidence, by a greater
weight.
So there's nothing really the
Division can do in working with Dr. Taylor to
protect the public.
See Transcript, 504:25 through 505:22 (Appendix 0305).
The Division does not attempt to include in its Findings of
Fact a finding along the lines of aggravation to the extent that it
supports its conclusion of aggravated circumstances. See Findings,
pp. 2-10 (Appendix 0005-0013).

Indeed, no evidence supports the

Division's conclusion of aggravation.
3.

Violation
of
Due
Process,
Unlawful
Process and Departure from Prescribed
Procedure.

Further, in its definition of unprofessional conduct and those
provisions

under

which

the Division

has

revoked

Dr.

Taylor's

license, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401 (2) (a) and § 58-1-501 (2) (b) and
(g) / § 58-28-2(6) and Utah Administrative Rule 156-28-8(3) (1994),
there

is

no

restitution

provision

that

failure

to

acknowledge,

or to rectify alleged wrongdoing

to

make

is definitionally

unprofessional conduct or a basis to revoke a license or take any
action against the licensee.

Nor did the Division alleged in its
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Petition

against

constitute

Dr.

Taylor

unprofessional

ultimately imposed.

that

conduct

lack
or

of

contrition

aggravate

the

might

sanction

See Petition, R 456-468.

It is clearly established that professionals who risk losing
their professional licenses or means of employment through action
of a public disciplinary body are entitled to due process.

e.g. In

Re Kirk

Licensing,

Division

v.

Division

of

Occupational

and

and Professional

Licensing,

Accordingly, to

licensees due process, the hearing must be prefaced by

timely notice which adequately

informs the parties of specific

issues they must be prepared to meet.
1207,

v.

779 P. 2d 1145,

1149 (Utah App. 1989) (social worker's license).
afford

Professional

815 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah App. 1991); and DB First

of Occupational

See

1213

deprive

the

(Utah 1983)
parties

of

Nelson

v. Jacobsen,

(citations omitted).
due

process,

the

In order not to
Utah

Supreme

determined that the Agency's
findings must be based on evidence presented
in the case, with an opportunity to all
parties to know of the evidence to be
submitted or considered, to cross-examine
witnesses, to offer evidence in explanation or
rebuttal and nothing can be treated as
evidence which is not introduced as such.
If the [agency] had intended to entertain the
issue of unqualified cancellation, it should
have notified [petitioner] and informed him
specifically
of the grounds
upon
which
cancellation was being sought.
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669 P. 2d

Court

Morris

v.

Public

Service

(citations omitted).

Comm'n,

321 P. 2d 644, 64 6 (Utah 1958)

It is also clearly

established

that due

process
is not a technical concept that can be reduced
to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, the
demands of due process rest on the concept of
basic fairness of procedure and demand a
procedure appropriate to the case and just to
the parties involved.
Nelson

v.

Jacobsen,

669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983).

While purportedly affording Dr. Taylor in this case a chance
to

contest

the

charges

brought

against

him,

to

cross-examine

witnesses, rebut documentary evidence and avail himself to the
adversary proceeding contemplated under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, the Division now seeks to punish him, without the
benefit of supporting substantial evidence, for not manifesting
contrition to the Board and to his accusers.
An analogue may be the problem avoided in the criminal arena
by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22, which provides in relevant
part:

"Upon the entry of the plea or verdict of guilty or plea of

no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which
shall be not less than 2 or more than 45 days after the verdict or
plea

.

.

."

This

rule

affords

a

convicted

defendant

"an

opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed.

The prosecuting attorney shall also be
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given an opportunity to present any information material to the
See

imposition of sentence."
22(a).

Utah Rule of Criminal

Procedure

Indeed, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides

that:
(a) the presiding officer can issue interim
orders to notify the parties of further
hearings;
(b)
notify
the
parties
of
provisional rulings on a portion of the issues
presented; or (c) otherwise provide for the
fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative
proceeding.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(4) (a) through (c) (1988 as amended) .
Dr. Taylor was not notified in the origiijal Petition that his
contesting the charges leveled against him and failure to manifest
contrition

were

elements

unprofessional conduct.

See

of

aggravation

of

Petition, R 456-468.

his

alleged

No evidence was

presented at trial by the Division supporting a conclusion of Dr.
Taylor's

recalcitrance

as

a

basis

for

aggravation

of

his

unprofessional conduct. Rather than enter its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on that evidence before it, and then reserving
and ordering a subsequent hearing
sanction

and

affording

Dr.

regarding

Taylor

the

the

imposition of

opportunity

to

put

on

evidence appropriately considered in the imposition of sanction,
the Division merely combined its decision and somehow divined from
the proceedings that Dr. Taylor's failure to acknowledge his wrong
to the Board and to his accusers, his failure to make restitution
or

rectify

his

alleged

wrongs
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and

his

overall

recalcitrance

aggravated his alleged unprofessional conduct to the extent that
his license should be revoked.

See Findings, pp. 18-20 (Appendix

0021-0023).
By including this determination of aggravation and in its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Division has violated
Dr. Taylor's due process resulting in substantial prejudice to him
through the revocation of his license held for over forty years
without

prior

sanction.

Since

the

Division's

action

was

unconstitutional and as the Division has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision making process and otherwise not availed
itself to procedure prescribed under the Administrative Procedures
Act, its Finding must be reversed.
II.

THE REVOCATION OF DR. TAYLOR'S LICENSE IS CONTRARY TO THE
DIVISION'S PRIOR PRACTICE.
As provided by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the

Utah Court of Appeals shall grant relief, on the basis of an
agency's record, if it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced because the agency action
is contrary to the agency's prior practice.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-16(4)(h)(iii). However, any agency action which is contrary to
its prior practice will not mandate this Court's relief if the
agency justifies its inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency.

Id.

The Division's revocation of Dr. Taylor's veterinarian license
here is not just contrary to the Agency's prior practice, it is a
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complete deviation from all prior formal licensing
involving veterinarian licenses.

proceedings

Further, the Division did not

attempt to justify or support this inconsistency

by

facts and

reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for it.

In

fact, in all the licensing actions taken against veterinarians, the
Division has never

permanently revoked a veterinarian's license.

(Copies of substantive documents reflecting all formal action of
the Division against veterinarians is annexed hereto as Appendix
0042 through 0173).
involving

Of six prior formal licensing proceedings

veterinarians,

not

one

license

was

suspended

from

veterinary practice entirely for more than a three-month period.
(Appendix

Id.)

In

stark

contrast,

Dr. Taylor's

license

was

revoked. This drastic departure constitutes a major deviation from
the Division's prior sanctions and without adequate explanation
setting

forth

facts

and

reasons

that

demonstrate

a

fair

and

rational basis for its inconsistency, this Court should reverse the
Division's Order.

Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).

Prior to commencing an action against Dr. Taylor, there have
been six formal agency actions commenced by the Division involving
veterinarian

licenses.

All

six

prior

formal

actions

involve

allegations of unprofessional conduct, as is the case at hand.

All

involve conduct related to the practice of veterinarian medicine.
All apply the identical statutory framework within the same act and
all resulted

in the imposition of a sanction.
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Combined

they

represent the prior formal agency action practice of the Division
against which the sanction in Dr. Taylor's case must be compared.
This

Court

interpreted

16(4) (h) (iii) in Pickett
(Utah App.

1993).

v.
It

the

Utah

language

Dept.

concluded

of

that

of

Section

Commerce,
provision

63-46b-

858 P.2d 187
"clearly

and

unambiguously requires consistent agency action in the absence of
an adequate rationale for the departure from prior action.

The

language is mandatory and includes neither exceptions nor latitude
for evading its requirements."
State

Tax Comm'n,

Id.

at 191.

In SEMECO v.

Utah

849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993), Justice Durham

in a dissenting opinion, which this Court has adopted, asserted
that:
Part (iii) of subsection (4) (h) permits relief
for agency action that is contrary to the
agency's prior practice. This provision also
demands reasonableness and rationality review,
explicitly permitting the inconsistency if the
agency can demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for it.
Hence, without exception or latitude, unless the Division provides
an adequate rational, which review is reasonable and rational, the
Division's

sanction

historic practice.

in this case must be consistent

with

its

Because the Division has failed to demonstrate

the rationality and reasonableness of its deviation, the Division's
order should be reversed

and remanded

consistent sanction.
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for an

imposition

of a

A.

Comparing The Six Prior Veterinary Formal
Licensing Proceedings.
The Division Dismissed
A Claim Despite
Allegations That A Veterinarian Was
Illegally Practicing Medicine By
Administering and Prescribing Controlled
Substances To Human Beings.

1.

In 1986, R.A.K. was alleged to have treated and prescribed a
Schedule II controlled substance, methylphenidate, to his son, Utah
Code Ann.
practice

§

58-37-4 (b) (iii) (D) .

medicine

or

to

R.A.K.

administer

substances to human beings.

and

was

not

prescribe

licensed

to

controlled

Consequently, his acts constituted

"violations of the Utah Controlled

Substance Act, The Medical

Practice Act and the Division of Occupational and

Professional

Licensing Act. . .,f Specifically, by prescribing and treating his
son with methylphenidate, R.A.K. was practicing medicine without a
license which is a felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30
(1981 Supp.).

In addition, by prescribing the controlled substance

without

license,

a

in

§ 58-37-6(7)(a)(i), R.A.K.

violation
was

not

of
only

Utah
subject

Code
to

Ann.
license

revocation, he was also committing a second degree felony offense.
Further, this willful violation of the law was not a one-time
occurrence.

Rather, R.A.K. was alleged to have knowingly treated

and prescribed the controlled substance during a continuous period
from July, 1985 through May, 1986.
violation

of

civil

and

criminal
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However, despite
laws,

the

R.A.K.'s

Department

of

Professional Licensing on October 21, 1986 summarily dismissed the
case with prejudice and without any hearing.

(Appendix 0042-0050).

The Division Merely Suspended
The
Veterinarians License for Three Months
Who Was Found Guilty Of Seven Counts Of
Second Degree Felony Theft, One Count Of
Third Degree Felony Theft And One ClassA Misdemeanor For Embezzling Funds From
A Clinic.

2.

In 1988, D.W.K. was found guilty of eight counts of felony
theft and one count of misdemeanor theft.

D.W.K. was sentenced to

60 days in jail, sentenced to probation, fined and required to pay
restitution.

These criminal convictions were the result of stolen

funds in excess of $16,750.00 payable to the animal clinic in which
he was one-half owner.
convictions,
turpitude.
fact

and

D.W.K.

Despite the severe nature of the theft

argued

his

crimes

did

not

involve

moral

After a full hearing, the Division in its findings of
conclusions

of

law held

that

D.W.K.

had

engaged

in

unethical business practices and inappropriate judgment which are
inherent

and

integral

aspects

of the veterinarian

profession.

Consequently, the criminal convictions "clearly constitute crimes
involving moral turpitude by reason of the nature of
conduct . . . "
of

[D.W.K.'s]

However, despite the felonious and immoral nature

D.W.K.'s conduct, the

Division

imposed

a mere

three-month

suspension of his veterinary license, which was later stayed in
lieu of his criminal probation..

(Appendix 0051-0063) .

52

3.

In A Case Involving Unprofessional Conduct Of
A Veterinarian With Respect To The Unsanitary
And Non-complying Nature Of His Facility, The
Division Precluded
A Veterinarian From
Practicing Until The Facility Was In Full
Compliance With Statutes And Rules.

In January, 1992, N.E.H. was found to be practicing veterinary
medicine in poor clinical settings. Specifically, N.E.H. failed to
maintain separate and distinct examination rooms in his veterinary
practice, violative of R153-28-3(A)(2)(b).

The existing room in

which N.E.H. performed his examinations lacked adequate sanitation
and

disease

control

and

represented

"no

appropriate

effort

whatsoever to comply with the requirements governing examination
rooms."

In addition, the marble surgical table used by the doctor

was a semi-porous material which could not be maintained
sanitary condition.

in a

N.E.H. also used wire, grocery-type shopping

carts to house the small animals which were treated and maintained
at the facility.

These enclosures were outdoors and therefore

could "not assure the comfort or sanitation of any animal which
might occupy them."

Generally, N.E.H. failed to maintain the

proper physical conditions necessary for a clinic.

After a full

hearing, the Division found and concluded that N.E.H. had violated,
at one time or another; R 153-28-3 (A) (1) (a) (4) , inadequate lighting
in a surgery room; R 153-28-3(A) (2) (b) , failure to maintain a
separate and distinct examination room; R 153-28-3(A)(2)(c) and R
153-28-3(A)(3)(a), for maintaining an unsanitary surgical table and
the use of unsanitary wire enclosures to house small animals.
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Despite his disregard for the animals' care and conditions, and his
failure

to

comply

with

the

clearly

established

rules

and

regulations, N.E.H. was allowed by the Division to continue his
practice of veterinary medicine but was ordered to get his facility
into

compliance

with

the

specified

veterinary license went unsanctioned.
4.

regulations.

N.E.H.'s

(Appendix 0064-0084) .

A Veterinarian Was Practicing Medicine On
Human Beings By Administering Controlled
Substances In An Attempt To Treat His Sons'
Attention Deficit Disorders. Despite this
Unlicensed Practice, The Division Placed The
Veterinarian's Controlled Substance License
On One-Year's Probation
But His License To
Practice Veterinarian Medicine Went
Unsanctioned.

In May, 1992, R.C.S. was found to have dispensed over a six
month period, 274 tablets of Ritalin, a Schedule II controlled
substance,

to

his

two

sons

Attention Deficit Disorder.

in an

attempt

to

R.C.S. dispensed

treat
these

them

for

controlled

substances knowing his licensure as a veterinarian and his license
to prescribe and administer controlled substances did not authorize
him to do so.

After a full board hearing, the Division found that

R.C.S. was engaged in unprofessional conduct and, by prescribing
and administering a controlled substance without a license, was in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-6(2) (b) , 58-37-2 (a) and 58-282(5).

Notably, by dispensing

controlled

substances without a

license, R.C.S.'s conduct violated criminal laws which could have
wrought a second degree felony conviction.
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R.C.S's privileges to

practice

veterinary

medicine

went

unsanctioned,

R.C.S.'s

controlled substance license was placed on probation for one year
and

he

was

cautioned

to

prescribe

and

administer

controlled

substances only for appropriate veterinary purposes,

(Appendix

0085-0102) .
5.

Probation
For One Year Was The Penalty
Imposed Upon A Veterinarian Who Allegedly
Administered And Dispensed A Controlled
Substance For Purposes Other Than Legitimate
Veterinary Use.

In 1990, it was alleged that J.P.R. unlawfully dispensed and
failed

to

properly

account

controlled substance.

for

200

tablets

of

a

schedule-II

It was alleged that J.P.R. was dispensing

the controlled substances to horse trainers to be administered at
their discretion in training and to stimulate the horses to run
faster.

J.P.R.'s conduct was unprofessional in that it allegedly

violated Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-28-6 (m) and

58-37-8 (a) (vi) , for

administering or dispensing a schedule-II controlled substance for
non-medical conditions; § 58-17-7(1), for unlawfully engaging in
the practice of pharmacy without a license; and § 58-37-8(a) for
failure to make or keep records of his dispensing a schedule-II
controlled substance.

After a formal action was commenced, the

Division entered into a stipulation with J.P.R. in which he neither
admitted nor denied the allegations, and was placed on probation
for a period of one year.

(Appendix 0103-0121).
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6.

The Division Ultimately Imposed A Three-Year
Probation
On A Veterinarian Who Admitted
Administering Demerol To Himself, A ScheduleII Controlled Substance, And Who Maintained
Fictitious Records To Hide His Personal
Abuse.

In 1993, by stipulation, R.A.J, admitted to administering to
himself doses of Demerol, a schedule-II controlled substance, in
order to medicate his neck pain.

R.A.J, also admitted that he

maintained fictitious records to account for the Demerol he used,
including the fabrication with in patient records of the use of the
drug when none was

in fact administered.

R.A.J,

admitted

to

filling the depleted containers of Demerol with other liquids in an
attempt to conceal the missing drug he personally used.

This

willful conduct violated Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-28-2(7)(b), for use
of a controlled substance to an "extent to render him unfit to
practice veterinary medicine, surgery or dentistry, . . . "; 58-378(2) (a) (i),

for

use

of

a controlled

substance

which

was

not

obtained by a valid prescription; and 58-37-6(5) (b) (i) , 58-378(4)(a)(iv) for falsely maintaining records of the disposition of
his controlled substance inventory and failure to maintain required
controlled substance records.

Upon his stipulation the Division

stayed R.A.J.'s license revocation in favor of a three-year term of
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probation subject to certain terms and conditions.

(Appendix 0122-

0147) .*
B.

The Division Has Acted In A Manner
With Its Prior Practice.

The Division's prior actions, in every

Inconsistent
instance and as a

practice, are inconsistent with the Division's order, in this case
revoking
Commerce,

Dr. Taylor's

In Pickett

license.

v.

Utah

Dept.

of

the petitioner Challenged the Division's decision to

revoke his license because of the inconsistency of his penalty with
Agency precedent imposing more lenient penalties for similar or
more egregious misconduct.

Pickett,

858 P.2d 187, 190.

Pickett

supported his contention by citing ten Agency decisions in which
members

of

significant

his

profession

violations

lighter penalties.

of

committed
the

law

allegedly

but

equal

received

or

more

substantially

The penalties in the cases he cited consisted

only of brief license suspensions, probation or a combination of
the two, but no license revocations.

Id.

at 192.

Although the

*The sanction in this case is an aberration as compared to any action taken by the Division
against a veterinarian. The Division has been consistent in its practice prior to, and since Dr.
Taylor's license revocation. Of note, the Division filed a petition on May 24, 1995 in which
it alleged that G J . failed to meet professional standards applicable to veterinary medicine in
Utah by incompetently and negligently performing 12 neuterings and/or spayings, failing to
provide competent care which resulted in the deaths of several animals and for improperly
soliciting patronage. In a stipulation and order entered April 23, 1996, one month after Dr.
Taylor's hearing, 10 days after his Order was entered, in which G.J. does not admit the
truthfulness of the allegations, and in light of evidence of the deaths of several animals and the
apparent pattern of negligence, the Division stayed a license revocation in lieu of probation for
a period of five years. (Appendix 0148-0172).

57

opinion did not describe or compare the alleged facts of each case,
this Court agreed that Pickett legitimately demonstrated that the
Division's

penalty

was

penalties imposed.

inconsistent

with

the

Division's

prior

The Court concluded that the burden shifted

onto the Agency to provide "facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency.11
this

Court

concluded

that

Mr.

Pickett's

Id.

license

Ultimately,
revocation

proceeding be remanded for imposition of a less onerous sanction
because the Division failed to adhere to the UAPA's plain mandate
that it provide a sufficient rationale for inconsistencies from
prior Agency action.
Like

that

of

Id.

at 192.

Pickett,

any

attempt

by

the

Division

to

distinguish the prior veterinarian licensing proceedings by simply
stating that those cases are not factually or procedurally similar
to the case at hand is of no moment.

This distinction, if it in

fact exists, is neither accurate nor a compelling basis for the
Division's extraordinary departure from its prior practice.

There

is no case law which requires that review of all prior Agency
proceedings be factually identical.

There is no case law which

requires a full agency hearing before the case can be compared to
subsequent Agency

actions.

The Administrative

Procedures

Act

requires that the Division provide reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency of the sanction imposed,
if the sanction

in the case

in question
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is

"contrary

to the

agency's prior practice".

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(iii).

Nothing in the statute limits the review of the agency's historic
actions to those cases factually apposite, or which ran the full
course of the administrative procedure available.

In determining

consistency, the rule requires that the instant action be compared
to the agency's prior practice.

Id.

If the inconsistency exists,

the agency must justify it.
In

comparison

to

the

other

formal

action

taken

by

the

Division, Dr. Taylor's conduct at best is five isolated instances
of negligence in his forty year practice of his profession.

Dr.

Taylor's conduct does not involve actions of criminality which
transcend his veterinary practice.
money from his partners.

Dr. Taylor did not steal any

Dr. Taylor did not administer controlled

substances to his children or to himself, or to others for illicit
purposes.

Dr. Taylor's alleged conduct did not call into question

issues of moral turpitude.
involves
practice.

mistakes,

At its worst, Dr. Taylor's conduct

blunders,

goof-ups,

in

the

course

of

his

Likely as a consequence of the Division's inference from

observations at the hearing of the absence of contrition on the
part of Dr. Taylor, the Division has interpreted

Dr. Taylor's

mistakes to be so egregious as to warrant revocation of a license
which has been in existence without sanction for over forty years,
when historically it has only slapped the hands of convicted and
alleged felons, drug abusers and a thief.
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It would seem the Division's imperative to protect the public
health safety and welfare, is best achieved by sanctioning criminal
conduct and acts of moral turpitude rather than putting out of
business long established institutions which for various reasons
make a few mistakes in the course of practice.
Cannon v. Gardner,
Dept.

of

611 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Utah 1980); Pickett

Commerce,

v.

Utah

858 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah App. 1993).

As in Pickett,
involve alleged

See generally,

the licensing actions cited
unprofessional

by Dr. Taylor

conduct equal to or greater

significance than that alleged against the Petitioner.

in

Allegations

which include the unlicensed practice of medicine and pharmacology
on human beings, the use of controlled substances and the overt
acts to conceal abuse, the embezzlement of funds from a clinic and
the use and maintenance of an unsanitary facility are far more
egregious than Dr. Taylor's conduct.

In light of the Division's

historic actions, the burden then is on it to "demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the departure from precedent in the instant
case.11

This the Division failed to do.

No where in its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law did the Division find, based on the
evidence

submitted

during

the

hearing,

or

otherwise

conclude

legally that there was a rational basis for departing from the
Division's consistent practice.
departure provided
"reasonableness

and

which

Nor was any explanation of the

this Court could

rationality."
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Pickett

judge
v.

based
Utah

on

Dept.

its
of

Commerce,

858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).

The Divisions imposition of sanction in this case must therefore
fail due to its inconsistency with its historic practice, and as no
explanation for the departure from the Agency's practice has been
provided.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Dr. Taylor

respectfully

requests that the Division's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Proposed
remanded

to

Order, and
the

the Division's

Division

for

entry

of

Order

be reversed

Findings

of

Fact

and
and

Conclusions of Law based on the entire record, and omitting any
reference

to

aggravating

supported by the record.
and remanded

factors

or

general

conclusions

not

Finally, this matter should be reversed

for a hearing on the appropriate

sanction

to be

imposed, if any with the instruction that the Division impose a
sanction

on

Dr.

Taylor's

license

consistent

with

its

prior

practices.
DATED this

1?

day of May, 1997.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

By:
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